

Logic and Language: Question 6

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Word count: 5310

What semantic rôle does 'Elizabeth' play in the sentence 'George said that Elizabeth had arrived'?

I am going to argue that it plays *no* semantic rôle. Why such an unnatural answer? Actually, it's not so unnatural, once we look in the right way at the sentence and how we use it. Suppose that rather than telling you what George *said* I tell you what George *did*, by uttering the sentence, 'George did this', and accompanying my utterance of 'this' with a push-up. What semantic rôle do my arms play in the sentence 'George did this'? The natural answer is: none. The original question is, I suggest, just like this one, and once we see that we can see that the natural answer is the same. What semantic rôle does 'Elizabeth' play in the sentence 'George said that Elizabeth had arrived'? None.¹

I

What is it for an expression to play a semantic rôle in a sentence? It is at least, I take it, to contribute to what the sentence says when it is used in a context: to say that the expression plays a semantic rôle in the sentence and yet contributes nothing to what the sentence says sounds to me like a contradiction.² On this as yet intuitive understanding, there seem to be good reasons to think that 'Elizabeth' plays a semantic rôle in:

- (1) George said that Elizabeth had arrived.

First, three observations: (a) for (1) to say something, 'Elizabeth' needs to be a meaningful expression - 'George said that gswpytinh had arrived' does not say anything because 'gswpytinh' is not meaningful; (b) if (1) does say something, then to know what it says a person needs to know what 'Elizabeth' means - if, unbeknownst to me, 'gswpytinh' is a meaningful expression and 'George said that gswpytinh had arrived' does say something, then I don't know what it says because I don't know what 'gswpytinh' means; and (c) to translate what (1) says into a different language we need to translate 'Elizabeth' - 'George a dit qu'Elizabeth était arrivée' is not an acceptable translation of (1) into French, unless 'Elizabeth' is a French word or at least taken to be one (if not, then this is at best a *partial* translation of (1), understandable only by French speakers who also know the *English* word 'Elizabeth'). Contrast this with the sentence:

- (2) 'Elizabeth' has nine letters.

In this case: (a) for (2) to say something 'Elizabeth' does not need to be a meaningful expression - "'gswpytinh' has nine letters" says something; (b) if (2) does say something, then to know what it says a person does not need to know what 'Elizabeth' means - I know what "'gswpytinh' has nine letters" says, but I do not know what 'gswpytinh' means (in fact I cannot know, because it has no meaning); and (c) to translate (2) into another language we do not need to translate 'Elizabeth' - "'Elizabeth' se compose de neuf lettres" is a perfectly acceptable translation into French, even if 'Elizabeth' is not a French word or taken to be one. Intuitively, there are these differences between (1) and (2) because in (1) 'Elizabeth' is *used* whereas in (2)

¹ Throughout this essay my interest is in sentences of the form 'S said that A' rather than 'S said "A"' (where in each case 'A' is to be replaced by a sentence). That is, my interest is in indirect discourse rather than in reported speech. Any ambiguity in what I say should be resolved in the direction of the first.

² In agreement with the way that most of us talk, I am going to talk as if there are such things as what a sentence says. I will assume an intuitive understanding of what such things might be, and at this stage not take a stand on whether or not there actually are such things. Later in the essay I will.

it is only *mentioned*. If a word's being used is a matter of its contributing to what is said, then it seems that 'Elizabeth' contributes to what (1) says.

Second, we can change what (1) says in a given context just by replacing 'Elizabeth' by an appropriately different name. Suppose that 'Sarah' is one such name. Then (1) does not say the same thing as:

(3) George said that Sarah had arrived.

If we can change what (1) says just by changing 'Elizabeth' to 'Sarah', then that suggests that 'Elizabeth' contributes to what (1) says: if it did not, then why does changing it change what (1) says?³

Third, suppose that I know that 'Elizabeth' as used in (1) does indeed have a bearer, and that I hear someone utter (1) and thereby say something. Then I am entitled to infer from *what was said* that George said something about Elizabeth. If 'Elizabeth' made no contribution to what was said, then how can I be entitled to infer *that*? And why am I entitled to infer from what was said that George said something about *Elizabeth* and not, say, The Tower of London? The natural answer is: because 'Elizabeth' was used rather than 'The Tower of London'. But if 'Elizabeth' made no contribution to what was said then how can the fact that it was used rather than some other expression effect what I am entitled to infer from what was said?

II

These are, I think, persuasive reasons to think that 'Elizabeth' contributes to what is said when (1) is used, and therefore that 'Elizabeth' plays a semantic rôle in (1). But there is, I will argue in this section, a problem for thinking that it does.

The problem is fairly immediate for anyone who hopes to give a purely extensional semantics for language. Some contexts of use suggest that the natural choice for the extension of a name is its bearer, but (1) can be true, even if 'Elizabeth' has no bearer, and (1) and (3) can have different truth values, even if 'Elizabeth' and 'Sarah' have the same bearer. Thus, if we allow that 'Elizabeth' plays a semantic rôle in (1) then we seem forced to accept that there is more to the semantics of a name than its having a bearer, and this seems to run counter to the aims of the extensionalist program.

But the problem remains even if we accept that there *is* more to a name than its having a bearer. If 'Elizabeth' plays a semantic rôle in (1) then there is just as much a problem for anyone who hopes to give a non-extensional semantics for language as well. My aim in this section is to show why.

Consider one very natural non-extensional view of language. According to this view, when a sentence is used in a context to say something it also expresses truth conditions, where the truth conditions that it expresses are distinct from what it says. What it says determine the truth conditions that it expresses, so that if two sentences say the same thing then they express the same truth conditions. But not conversely - two sentences may express the same truth conditions and yet say different things (If Elizabeth is Sarah but 'Elizabeth' and 'Sarah' are introduced in the right way then 'Elizabeth had arrived' and 'Sarah had arrived' might be two such sentences). Any expression that plays a semantic rôle in the sentence contributes to what the sentence says, and in virtue of that contributes to the truth conditions that it expresses. We may call the

³ What is an 'appropriately different name'? This is perhaps difficult to say. 'One with a different Fregean sense' will do, if we accept that there are such things. If not, 'one with a different bearer' will do. For anyone in doubt, the examples could be changed to use uncontroversially different names: 'George Bush' and 'Tony Blair', perhaps.

contribution that it makes to what the sentence says the *sense* of the expression in that sentence, and the contribution that it makes to the truth conditions expressed by the sentence the *reference* of the expression in that sentence.⁴ Just as what a sentence says determines the truth conditions that it expresses, what an expression contributes to what the sentence says (its sense) determines what the expression contributes to the truth conditions that the sentence expresses (its reference). This principle is important for what I am going to say, so here it is more explicitly ('SDR' for 'sense determines reference'):

- (SDR) If the sense of 'α' in the sentence '*** α ***' is the same as the sense of 'β' in '●●● β ●●●' then the reference of 'α' in the sentence '*** α ***' is the same as the reference of 'β' in '●●● β ●●●'. That is, if 'α' and 'β' make the same contribution to what is said by '*** α ***' and '●●● β ●●●', respectively, then they make the same contribution to the truth conditions of '*** α ***' and '●●● β ●●●', respectively.⁵

The notion of 'contribution' here is such that the following conditions constrain what the sense and reference of an expression can be. Suppose that 'α' is an expression that plays a semantic rôle in the sentence '... α ...', 'β' is an expression that plays a semantic rôle in the sentence '... β ...', and '... β ...' is obtained from '... α ...' by replacing 'α' by 'β' (or we might say: '... α ...' and '... β ...' are obtained by completing 'α' and 'β' by the same incomplete expression)⁶. Then:

- (S) The sense of 'α' in '... α ...' is the same as the sense of 'β' in '... β ...' if and only if in every context '... α ...' and '... β ...' say the same thing. That is, 'α' makes the same contribution to what '... α ...' says as 'β' makes to what '... β ...' says if and only if in every context '... α ...' and '... β ...' say the same thing.
- (R) The reference of 'α' in '... α ...' is the same as the reference of 'β' in '... β ...' if and only if in every context '... α ...' and '... β ...' express the same truth conditions. That is, 'α' makes the same contribution to the truth conditions expressed by '... α ...' as 'β' makes to the truth conditions expressed by '... β ...' if and only if in every context '... α ...' and '... β ...' express the same truth conditions.

Suppose, now, that 'Elizabeth' plays a semantic rôle in both (1) and (4):

- (1) George said that Elizabeth had arrived
(4) Elizabeth had arrived

Since it plays a semantic rôle in (1) it contributes to what (1) says in a context and to the truth conditions expressed by (1) in that context, thus it has a sense and a reference in (1).⁷ Similarly, it has a sense and a reference in (4). I am going to argue that the sense of 'Elizabeth' in (1) is the same as the sense of 'Elizabeth' in (4), but the reference of 'Elizabeth' in (1) is not the same as the reference of 'Elizabeth' in (4), in contradiction to (SDR).

First, the sense of 'Elizabeth' in (1) is the same as the sense of 'Elizabeth' in (4). For consider the sentences:

⁴ I am allowing, here, that a word may have a different sense or reference in different sentences.
⁵ Note that '*** α ***' and '●●● α ●●●' may be different expressions. (That is, '*** ... ***' and '●●● ... ●●●' may be different *incomplete* expressions.)
⁶ I am assuming that the incomplete expression '... ...' is understood in the same way when completed by 'α' as it is when completed by 'β'. To ensure this, I could specify that throughout this section I am only considering expressions (complete and incomplete) that are not ambiguous.
⁷ I am taking it that truth conditions are such that 'Elizabeth' can contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence even without having a bearer.

- (3) George said that Sarah had arrived
- (5) Sarah had arrived

If ‘Elizabeth’ plays a semantic rôle in both (1) and (4) then ‘Sarah’ plays a semantic rôle in both (3) and (5), and so ‘Sarah’ has a sense and a reference in both (3) and (5). The meaning of the ‘S said that ...’ construction is such that in any given context, (1) and (3) say the same thing in that context if and only if (4) and (5) say the same thing in that context. So (1) and (3) say the same thing in every context if and only if (4) and (5) say the same thing in every context. Thus, by (S), the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1) is the same as the sense of ‘Sarah’ in (3) if and only if the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) is the same as the sense of ‘Sarah’ in (5). That is, in any context, we can replace ‘Elizabeth’ by ‘Sarah’ in (1) without affecting what (1) says if and only if we can replace ‘Elizabeth’ by ‘Sarah’ in (4) without affecting what (4) says. This *suggests* that ‘Elizabeth’ makes the same contribution to both what (1) says and what (4) says.

But it doesn’t establish that it does, so consider another argument. Suppose that you utter (4), and then I utter (6), intending my use of ‘that’ in (6) to refer to what you said when you uttered (4):

- (4) Elizabeth had arrived
- (6) George said that

When I utter (6), I say the same thing as I would have had I uttered (1): ‘George said that Elizabeth had arrived’. For it would be strange of someone, having heard and understood what I said, to correct me by saying, ‘No, George said that Elizabeth had arrived’ (the natural response is for me to say, ‘Yes, that’s what I said’). Now, if (6) says the same thing as (1), and if ‘Elizabeth’ in (1) contributes to what (1) says, then ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) contributes to what (6) says. But ‘Elizabeth’ can only have contributed to what (6) says whatever it is that it contributed to what (4) says, because it is only used in (4) and only ‘gets one chance’ to make a contribution. When I utter (6), I cannot use ‘Elizabeth’ to contribute to what I say anything that you hadn’t already used it to contribute to what you said in uttering (4). So the contribution that ‘Elizabeth’ makes to what (4) says is the same as the contribution that it makes to what (6) says; but what (6) says is the same as what (1) says, so the contribution that ‘Elizabeth’ makes to what (4) says is the same as the contribution that it makes to what (1) says. That is, the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) is the same as the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1).

Second, the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1) is not the same as the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4). For suppose that it is. Suppose that ‘Elizabeth’ and ‘Sarah’ were introduced into the language in such a way that they have the same bearer, but that in at least some contexts (4) and (5) say different things⁸ (that is, the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) is different from the sense of ‘Sarah’ in (5)), so that in least some contexts (1) and (3) have different truth values. Since ‘Elizabeth’ and ‘Sarah’ have the same bearer, in every context (4) and (5) express the same truth conditions, so, by (R), the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) is the same as the reference of ‘Sarah’ in (5). But since we are assuming that the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4) is the same as the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1), it follows that the reference of ‘Sarah’ in (5) is the same as the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1). But the reference of ‘Sarah’ in (3) is not the same as the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1), because there is at least one context in which (1) and (3) have different truth values and hence express different truth conditions. Thus the reference of ‘Sarah’ in (3) is not the same as the reference of ‘Sarah’ in (5). So the following cannot both be true: (i) the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ is the same in both (1) and (4), and (ii) the reference of ‘Sarah’ is the same in both (3) and (5). But the situation is symmetrical between ‘Elizabeth’ and ‘Sarah’, so

⁸ I take it that this is possible. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, for example, were introduced in such a way that in some contexts (perhaps all) ‘Hesperus rises in the east’ and ‘Phosphorus rises in the east’ say different things.

there is no reason to think that one of (i) or (ii) is true and the other false. So they are both false. In particular, (i) is false, and the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (1) is not the same as the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ in (4).

So, on the assumption that ‘Elizabeth’ plays a semantic rôle in (1) and (4) we have derived the result that the sense of ‘Elizabeth’ is the same in (1) and (4), but the reference of ‘Elizabeth’ is not the same in (1) and (4), in contradiction to (SDR). So we must give up either (SDR), or the claim that ‘Elizabeth’ plays a semantic rôle in (1) and (4). But (SDR) is intuitively compelling: how could two expressions make the same contribution to what is said by a sentence, but different contributions to the truth conditions that it expresses, given that what a sentence says determines the truth conditions that it expresses? Furthermore, to give up (SDR) is to give up a connection between the sense and reference of an expression that is important to the view of language under discussion, a connection without which the sense of an expression cannot play some of the rôle that the view intends it to play. So proponents of the view seem forced to deny that ‘Elizabeth’ plays a semantic rôle in (1). Either that, or deny that it plays a semantic rôle in (4). But it is difficult to see how one could do that without also denying that it plays a semantic rôle in (1).

It would be nice for both camps, extensional and non-extensional, if we could deny that ‘Elizabeth’ plays a semantic rôle in (1), and explain away appearances to the contrary. I think that we can.

III

I propose two things. First, that in order to make sense of much of what we say about what we say, we need to take ourselves to be talking about things-that-are-said: things that get said whenever we use a sentence to say something. I do not propose that they are anything in particular - they might be propositions, or Fregean thoughts, or some other such thing. I just propose that we are talking about such things. I have argued elsewhere that in order to make sense of much of what we say about the way things look we need to take ourselves to be talking about ways of looking - things that objects have whenever they look a certain way - and many of my arguments there for why could be turned into arguments here for why.⁹ But in the end, I think that the best argument is this: that by taking ourselves to be talking about things-that-are-said we can develop a good theory of what we mean when we talk about what we say.

Second, I propose that the logical form of (1) is:

(7) George said this,

where ‘said’ expresses a relation between people and things-that-are-said, and ‘this’ is a demonstrative referring to a thing-that-is-said. The expression ‘that Elizabeth had arrived’ should be thought of as a demonstrative ‘this’ accompanied by a *display* of the thing-that-is-said that is being demonstrated; ‘Elizabeth had arrived’ says what George says and thus makes it available for demonstration. It is like me saying, ‘George did this’, and accompanying my utterance of ‘this’ with a display of what George did - I *do* what George did so that I can demonstrate it. So too, in (1), I *say* what George said so that I can demonstrate it. This analogy will play an important rôle in what I am going to say.¹⁰

This proposal is along the same lines as, but importantly different from, Davidson’s *paratactic* treatment of indirect discourse.¹¹ Davidson proposes that the logical form of (1) is:

⁹ See Me (2003), especially pp. 5-7.

¹⁰ It is to make closer the analogy between (1) and ‘George did this’ that I have used ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ in (7).

¹¹ See Davidson (2001).

(8) George said that. Elizabeth had arrived.

where 'said' expresses a relation between people and utterances, 'that' is a demonstrative referring to an utterance of the sentence that follows it ('Elizabeth had arrived'), and where 'S said U' means something like: some utterance of S's and the utterance U make S and the utterer of U samesayers.¹² There are a number of well known problems for this proposal, of which I will consider two that arise from the aspects of his proposal that are most significantly different from mine.¹³

The first arises from Davidson's claim that 'said' expresses a relation between people and *utterances*. By an 'utterance' he means an utterance *token*, so that if I utter 'Elizabeth had arrived' twice in succession then I have made two distinct utterances. But consider the following dialogue:

A: Elizabeth had arrived.
B: George said that.
A: Elizabeth had arrived.
B: That's another thing that George said.¹⁴

A's first utterance is such that George said it, and A's second utterance is such that George said it. So there are two things that George said. We can continue the conversation and multiply it will the number of things that George said. The things said by George are, on Davidson's account, not necessarily his utterances but utterances of possibly anybody's, and the answer to the question, 'How many things did George say?', depends upon the totality of utterances ever made. But if we take the relation expressed by 'said', as I suggest we do, to be a relation between people and things-that-are-said rather than utterances, then we are not faced with these counterintuitive results. In line 2 of the conversation, B is referring to what A said in line 1, and in line 4 of the conversation, B is referring to what A said in line 3; what A said in line 3 is the same as what A said in line 1 (i.e. the two are numerically identical), so B is wrong to think that there is *another* thing that George said.

A related problem has to do with the fact that this sentence is *ambiguous*:

(9) John said that someone heard the shooting of the hunters.¹⁵

An utterance of (9) could be understood as saying either that John said that someone heard the hunters shooting, or that John said that someone heard the hunters being shot. The problem for Davidson is that, according to his proposal, (9) is not ambiguous. It is to be understood as saying:

(9') John said that. Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

where 'that' refers to an utterance of the sentence that follows. What is said by (9) is given by the first sentence of (9'), 'John said that', and there is no ambiguity in that sentence: there is one and only one utterance of 'Someone heard the shooting of the hunters' for 'that' to refer to. But if we understand (9), as I propose, as saying:

¹² Davidson does not intend this to be a well-considered analysis of 'S said U', but merely a first suggestion.

¹³ For a fuller discussion of the problems that face Davidson's theory see, for example, Frankish (1996), Haack (1971), McFetridge (1975-76), Platts (1997, pp. 117-26), and Rumfitt (1993).

¹⁴ Here I am using, with modification, an argument given by McFetridge (1975-76), p. 131.

¹⁵ This example is taken from Rumfitt (1993), pp. 435-6.

(9") John said this.

where 'this' refers to what is said by 'someone heard the shooting of the hunters', then we *do* get the desired ambiguity: it is ambiguous what is said by 'someone heard the shooting of the hunters', and thus ambiguous what 'this' refers to, and thus ambiguous what (9") says.

The second of the two problems that I want to consider arises from Davidson's suggestion that (1) should be analysed into *two* sentences (one used assertively, one used non-assertively). This makes it hard for him to give an account of sentences in which we *quantify into* the 'that'-clause in indirect discourse. Suppose that (1) is true and that I think that 'Elizabeth' as used in (1) does indeed have a bearer. Then I might want to assert the sentence:

(10) There is someone such that George said that that person had arrived.

What, according to Davidson's proposal, is the logical form of (10)? It cannot be:

(11) George said that. $(\exists x)(x \text{ had arrived})$,

because this does not have the required ontological commitment to *there being* someone whom George said had arrived. It cannot be:

(12) $(\exists x)(\text{George said that. } x \text{ had arrived})$,

because if (12) is true, and true in virtue of George having said of, say, Elizabeth that she had arrived, and if 'Sarah' is *any* name for Elizabeth, then (12) is equally true in virtue of George having said of Sarah that she had arrived, from which it follows, according to (12), that George said that Sarah had arrived. That is a consequence that we do not want. If (12) is not the logical form of (10) then it is difficult to see what is.

According to the analysis that I am suggesting, the logical form of (10) is:

(13) $(\exists x)(\text{George said this})$,

where 'this' in (13) refers to a different thing-that-is-said than the 'this' in (7). Then the logical form of the inference from 'George said that Elizabeth had arrived' to 'There is someone such that George said that that person had arrived', is:

Prem: George said this

Conc: Therefore, there is someone such that George said this,

where the demonstrative 'this' changes its reference from the first occurrence to the second. If this seems a little strange, then perhaps it will help to compare it to the following one. Suppose that you say to me, 'George did this', and accompany your utterance of 'this' by a performance of a punching-someone-in-the-stomach action. I believe that George only does such things when he actually *is* punching someone in the stomach, and that he always shakes their hand after doing so. Making the appropriate inference I say, 'So, there is someone with whom George did this', and accompany my utterance of 'this' with a shaking of your hand. The inference has this form:

Prem: George did this

Conc: Therefore, there is someone with whom George did this,

where the demonstrative 'this' changes its reference from the first occurrence to the second. The inference in the case of 'said' is no more (and no less) problematic than it is in the case of 'did'. So by taking the logical form to be just 'George said this', and not including in that form the

sentence ‘Elizabeth had arrived’, we avoid the problems that quantifying in poses to Davidson’s theory.

If I am right in claiming that the logical form of (1) is ‘George said this’, then ‘Elizabeth had arrived’, and more specifically ‘Elizabeth’, play *no* semantic rôle in (1). But given the strong natural inclination to think that ‘Elizabeth’ does, backed up by the arguments given in Section I, shouldn’t we regard this as a *reductio ad absurdum* of my claim?

I think that once we look in the right way at (1) we can reverse that natural inclination and explain away those arguments. Consider again the case of my uttering:

(14) George did this,

and accompanying my utterance of ‘this’ with a display of what George did. Suppose, for definiteness, that it was a push-up, and that I was talking to you. Then: (i) for me to have said something, what I did needs to have been an action; (ii) to know what I have said, you need to know what I did - had we been talking on the phone so that you could not see what I did, then you would not know what I said; (iii) I could have said something different by using my tongue rather than my arms; and (iv) anyone who knows what I said is entitled to infer from what I said that George did something with his arms.

Are these good reasons to think that my action, and in particular my arms, contributed to what I said? In one sense of ‘contributed’ I think that the answer is *yes*: I used my arms to perform a push-up, and in so doing placed an action into the context of my utterance which then became the object of my demonstrative ‘this’. My utterance of ‘this’ also contributed to what I said, but in a fundamentally different way - it contributed *directly* to what I said, by pointing at what I did. What I did, on the other hand, contributed *only indirectly* to what I said, by putting something into the context of my utterance that could then be pointed at. We have here two senses of ‘contribution’ - call them *direct* and *indirect* - and it is natural to think that only the first is a *semantic* contribution to what I said. In this semantic sense of ‘contributed’ I think that the answer is *no*: my push-up and my arms did *not* contribute to what I said.¹⁶

Are the reasons that I gave in Section I good reasons to think that when I use (1) to say something, ‘Elizabeth had arrived’, and in particular ‘Elizabeth’, contribute to what I say? I think that they are parallel to the reasons just given for thinking that my arms contribute to what (14) says, and that we should answer in a similar way. In one sense of ‘contribute’ the answer is *yes*: I use ‘Elizabeth’ as part of ‘Elizabeth had arrived’ to say something, and in so doing place a thing-that-is-said into the context of my utterance which can then be demonstrated. But this is a contribution in the indirect sense. In the above case it was natural to think that this is not a *semantic* contribution - my arms have no linguistic meaning, even if I use them to contribute to what was said by doing a push-up. So why should we say that in this case the contribution that ‘Elizabeth’ makes is a *semantic* one? If we do, then I think we are bound to say that my arms made a semantic contribution in the previous case. But that sounds wrong. I think that we should say that in the semantic sense of ‘contribute’ the answer is *no*: ‘Elizabeth’ does *not* contribute to what I say. ‘Elizabeth’ plays no more of a semantic rôle in (1) than my arms do in (14). If we are inclined to think otherwise it is, I suggest, because it *does* play a semantic rôle in ‘Elizabeth had arrived’, and that rôle is exploited when I use it to put a thing-that-is-said into the context of (1). In the case of (14), I do something in order to say something, and there is no danger of confusing what I do as part of what I say. But in the case of (1), I say something in order to say something, and we have to be careful to not mistake the first as a semantically significant part of the second.

¹⁶ I considered calling the two senses ‘active’ and ‘passive’, but I think that would be misleading - my arms play as active a rôle as my words.

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