

Making Wylie Breckenridge

I propose an account of what it is to make an object. Then I propose an account of the way that we talk about making objects. Then I use the two accounts to defend the position that a statue which coincides with a piece of alloy is identical to that piece of alloy.

1. Motivation

What is it to make an object? A natural first answer is this:

(1) To make an object x is to bring x into existence

When a carpenter makes a chair, she brings the chair into existence – it does not exist before she makes it, but it does exist after she makes it.

But there is a problem for this account: it is possible to make an object without bringing it into existence. I did it this morning, in fact, when I made myself an egg for breakfast by hard-boiling it. I did not bring the egg into existence – it already existed before I made it – but I still count as having made the egg. So it is possible to make an object without bringing it into existence, and (1) is not a correct account of what it is to make an object.

It is tempting to defend (1) at this point by distinguishing two kinds of making – the kind that the carpenter does to the chair, of which (1) is a correct account, and the kind that I did to the egg, of which we need a different account, perhaps the following:

(2) To make an object x is, for some kind k , to change x from not being a k into being a k .

According to (2), I count as having made the egg this morning because there is a kind k such that I changed the egg from not being a k into being a k (the kind *hard-boiled thing*, for one).

But this response concedes that there is such a thing as making, of which the action performed by the carpenter and the action performed by me are different kinds, and it leaves unanswered our original question: what is the nature of *that*? We want to know what it is that is *common* between the actions performed in the chair and egg cases, in virtue of which they both count as making.

Perhaps the idea is that there is *nothing* in common between them. That requires that the verb ‘make’ expresses distinct kinds of action when used to talk about the chair and egg cases, either because it is ambiguous (like ‘bank’) or because it is context-sensitive (like ‘tall’). For if it expressed the same kind of action in each case then being of *that* kind is something that the two actions have in common, and our question is: what is it to be of *that* kind? So the idea is this: when used to talk about the chair case ‘make’ expresses an action of one kind, call it ‘making₁’, of which (1) is a correct account, but when used to talk about the egg case it expresses an action of a distinct kind, call it ‘making₂’, of which (1) does not

purport to be an account (so the egg case is not a counterexample to (1)). Note that this is not, strictly speaking, a ‘two kinds of making’ response, because to claim that these are two kinds of making would be to claim either that they are two kinds of making₁ or that they are two kinds of making₂, depending on which kind of action is expressed by ‘making’ in the claim that they are two kinds of making, and neither of these is the claim being made by the present response. But perhaps we can loosely say that it is a ‘two kinds of making’ response (just as we might loosely say that there are two kinds of banks – money banks and river banks).

There are a couple of challenges for this idea. First, many people judge that there *is* something in common between the actions performed in the chair and egg cases, in virtue of which they both count as making. The first challenge is to explain why they are mistaken about this. The second challenge is to provide arguments that ‘make’ is ambiguous or context-sensitive in this way. Appealing to ambiguity or context-sensitivity makes it dangerously easy to defend (1) against the apparent counterexample of the egg case, and it seems to me that the burden of proof is on those who claim that ‘make’ is ambiguous or context-sensitive, rather than on those who claim that it is not. These challenges are especially pressing if we can come up with a workable theory according to which ‘make’ expresses a single kind of action which is performed in both the chair and egg cases. My aim in this paper is to argue that we can.

Perhaps the ‘two kinds of making’ intuition is getting at the following instead: yes, there is a single kind of action, making, that the carpenter does the chair and I did to the egg, but it is a *disjunctive* kind of action, so that perhaps the following is a correct account of making:

- (3) To make an object *x* is to *either* bring *x* into existence *or*, for some kind *k*, change *x* from not being a *k* into being a *k*.

Note that this is to concede that (1) is not a correct account of making, and to offer an alternative account in its place.

It is not clear that this disjunctive response can account for those people who judge that there is something in common between the actions performed in the chair and egg cases, without predicting (wrongly) that they will judge, of *any* two actions, that there is something in common between them. But even if it can, disjunctive accounts are sufficiently unsatisfying that we should not settle for one until we have more fully explored the possibility of finding a non-disjunctive account. I hope to show that there is a workable account on which ‘make’ expresses a single kind of non-disjunctive action when used to talk about both the chair and egg cases.

2. A proposal

I propose that (2) is a correct account of the making involved in both the chair and egg cases.

At first glance it seems that this cannot be right. Just as the egg case is a counterexample to (1), the chair case is a counterexample to (2): the carpenter makes the chair, but there is no

kind *k* such that the carpenter changes the chair from not being a *k* into being a *k*, because the chair does not exist before the carpenter makes it, and she cannot change what does not exist. But I shall argue that the chair case is *not* a counterexample to (2): the chair does exist before the carpenter makes it, and the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair. I shall present two arguments that this is so.

First argument

There are three major steps in this argument. *First*. When the carpenter makes the chair she makes it from some thing. If the carpenter were asked what she is making the chair from it seems that it would be false of her to say that she is making it from nothing. This is compatible with her making it from some *things*, rather than from some *thing*. But suppose she is making it from some things, say some pieces of timber. Then it seems equally true that she is making it from *a collection* of those things, no matter how widely scattered they are. Admittedly, if the things are very widely scattered then we might be reluctant to say that they form a collection, but perhaps that is because it would be misleading rather than false (it might misleadingly suggest that they have been collected together). *Second*. This thing that the carpenter makes the chair from exists before the carpenter makes the chair (I take it to be uncontroversial that *if* there is some thing from which the carpenter makes the chair *then* that thing exists before the carpenter makes the chair). *Third*. This thing that the carpenter makes the chair from is identical to the chair (this is why it is important that there is some thing rather than some things from which the carpenter makes the chair – the chair is a single thing and cannot be identical to many things). After the carpenter makes the chair we might say (truly) that what used to be just a collection of pieces of timber is now a chair (i.e. the very same thing used to be a collection of pieces of timber and is now a chair).¹ Putting all this together we get: the chair exists before the carpenter makes it, and the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair.

This first argument relies on two controversial claims: that the carpenter makes the chair from some thing, and that the chair she makes is identical to the thing from which she makes it. The second argument, which I consider to be the stronger of the two, does not rely on either of these two claims.

Second argument

In a series of papers, Timothy Williamson (1998, 2000, 2002) has defended the view that there is a sense of ‘exist’ in which existence is necessary: necessarily, everything that exists necessarily exists. A temporal corollary of this (as Williamson points out) is that there is a sense of ‘exist’ in which existence is eternal: always, everything that exists always exists. The sense of ‘exist’ for which these claims hold is what Williamson calls the *logical* sense

¹ The claim is that the chair is identical to the thing from which it is made, not that it is identical to the stuff (if any) that composes the thing from which it is made. So if the chair is made from a collection of pieces of timber, the claim is that the chair is identical to the collection of pieces of timber, not that it is identical to the timber that composes the pieces of timber.

of 'exist'. It is the most encompassing sense of 'exist': anything that exists in any sense at all exists in the logical sense.²

Given that existence in the logical sense is eternal we can argue as follows. After the carpenter makes the chair, the chair exists. Since it exists in some sense it exists in the logical sense. Since it exists then in the logical sense it exists always in the logical sense. So the chair exists in the logical sense before the carpenter makes it.

We still do not quite have what we want: we also want that the carpenter changes the chair from not being a chair into being a chair, and whether or not that is plausible might depend upon what it is to exist in the logical sense. So I will now clarify that, and hope that in so doing I will make more plausible the claim that existence in the logical sense is necessary (and eternal).

What is it for something to exist in the logical sense? Consider the claim that Socrates now exists in the logical sense. The claim is not that Socrates is alive. That claim is false, because Socrates is not now alive: if I were to count the number of things that are alive then I ought to not count Socrates (but I ought to count Tony Blair); Socrates is not a counterexample to the claim that nothing is alive (but Tony Blair is). The claim is not that Socrates is human. That claim is also false, because Socrates is not now human: if I were to count the number of humans that there are then I ought to not count Socrates (but I ought to count Tony Blair); Socrates is not a counterexample to the claim that there are no humans (but Tony Blair is). So there are some kinds k such that Socrates does not now count amongst the k -s, and is not now a counterexample to the claim that there are no k -s. But there are also some kinds k such that Socrates does now count amongst the k -s, and is now a counterexample to the claim that there are no k -s. One such kind is *past philosopher*: if I were to count the number of past philosophers that there are then I ought to count Socrates (but I ought to not count Tony Blair), and Socrates is a counterexample to the claim that there are no past philosophers (but Tony Blair is not). Another such kind is *past human*: if I were to count the number of past humans that there are then I ought to count Socrates (but I ought to not count any of the dinosaurs), and Socrates is a counterexample to the claim that there are no past humans (but the dinosaurs are not). So there are some kinds k such that Socrates now counts as one of the k -s, and is now a counterexample to the claim that there are no k -s. This is one way to understand the claim that Socrates now exists in the logical sense.³

So understood, here is one way to argue that Socrates *always* exists in the logical sense – that is, that at any time t there is at least one kind k such that Socrates counts as one of the k -s at t , and is a counterexample to the claim that there are no k -s at t . Suppose that Socrates

² Williamson gives at least three reasons why existence in this sense is necessary: first, it follows from the simplest semantic account of quantified modal logic (1998, pp. 259-61); second, accounts of quantified modal logic on which it does not follow that existence is necessary typically presuppose that it is in the metalanguage in order to give the semantics of the object language (1998, pp. 262-4); third, the supposition that some object d does not necessarily exist leads to a contradiction (informal version (1998, p. 264), more formal version (2002, pp. 233-44)).

³ For his clarification of these issues, see Williamson (1998, pp. 259, 265-9), Williamson (2000), and Williamson (2002, pp. 244-51).

became a philosopher at time t_1 and stopped being a philosopher at time t_2 (assume for simplicity that there are sharp temporal cut-off points for being a philosopher). If at some time t before t_1 someone were to count the number of future philosophers that there are, then she ought to count Socrates, and Socrates is at that time a counterexample to the claim that there are no future philosophers. If at some time t between t_1 and t_2 (inclusive) someone were to count the number of philosophers that there are, then she ought to count Socrates, and Socrates is at that time a counterexample to the claim that there are no philosophers. If at some time t after t_2 someone were to count the number of past philosophers that there are, then she ought to count Socrates, and Socrates is at that time a counterexample to the claim that there are no past philosophers. So at any time t there is at least one kind k such that Socrates counts as one of the k -s at t , and is a counterexample to the claim that there are no k -s at t . So at any time t Socrates exists in the logical sense at t . So Socrates always exists in the logical sense.⁴

Return now to the chair case. We have argued that the chair exists in the logical sense before the carpenter makes it. This is compatible with it not being a concrete thing at the time, such as a collection of pieces of timber – all it requires is that there be a kind k such that the chair counts amongst the k -s at the time, and there is at least one such k : it counts among the *future chairs*. The chair is not a chair at that time, but it is a chair after the carpenter makes it. Can we claim that the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair? Perhaps we can, if as well as being a future chair it is also some concrete thing, such as a collection of pieces of timber. But what if it is not?⁵ I don't see why that would stop us from claiming that the carpenter changes it. Because of what the carpenter does, the world changes from being one in which the chair is not a chair (nor concrete) into one in which it is a chair (and concrete). There is a sense in which the chair itself changes from not being a chair into being a chair, and it does so because of what the carpenter does. So there is a sense in which the carpenter changes the chair from not being a chair into being a chair. This completes the second argument.

I have just presented two arguments that the carpenter does not bring the chair into existence. But what about the intuition that she does? Suppose the chair is merely a future chair before the carpenter makes it, and not some concrete thing at the time. Then we can say that the intuition is the *correct* intuition that the carpenter brings the chair into concreteness (Williamson argues that there is a sense of 'exist' on which it means something like 'be concrete'⁶). But what if the chair is already some concrete thing before the carpenter makes it (perhaps a collection of pieces of timber)? It is tempting to try endorsing the intuition as follows: by 'bring the chair into existence' we mean 'bring it about that there is one more chair', and that is indeed something that the carpenter does. But if we had this way of talking then it ought to be acceptable to say, when a woman divorces her husband, that she brought a bachelor into existence, and that is not an

⁴ We could reach the same conclusion starting from the fact that there was a period of time during which Socrates was a human, or from any other of various such facts.

⁵ Note that if there *is* a problem here for the idea that the carpenter changes something that is not concrete, it might also be a problem for the idea that the carpenter brings into existence something that does not exist: if the chair does not exist before the carpenter makes it, can we plausibly claim that the carpenter brings *it* into existence?

⁶ See, for example, Williamson (2002, pp. 245-6).

acceptable thing to say.⁷ It seems to me that in this case there is no sense of ‘exist’ on which the carpenter brings the chair into existence, and so the intuition is false. This is supported by the observation that anyone who accepts that the chair was a collection of pieces of timber before the carpenter made it is open to having the intuition corrected: she says, ‘The chair did not exist before the carpenter made it’; I say, ‘Yes it did – it was a collection of pieces of timber’; she accepts the correction. But why did she say something false in the first place? Perhaps it was just loose talk: the chair was so scattered before the carpenter made it that she was, for simplicity and without doing any harm, taking it to not have existed (just as, when it is 3:31 pm, we might, for simplicity and without doing any harm, take it to be 3:30 pm).

Before moving on, here is one further reason to think that the chair exists before the carpenter makes it, and that the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair: it is a consequence of an account of the English progressive construction being developed by Zoltan Szabo (2004, m.s.). Suppose that a carpenter is making a chair but has not yet finished. According to Szabo’s account, her making has a theme – the thing that she is making. It is not a chair at the time – it is a chair-in-progress. At the end of the making it is a chair, the chair that the carpenter makes. So according to Szabo’s account, the chair that results from the making exists as soon as the carpenter starts to make it (and perhaps before that as well). So it exists before it counts as having been made, before the carpenter makes it, and the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair. So if Szabo’s account of the English progressive is right, then the chair exists before the carpenter makes it, and the carpenter changes it from not being a chair into being a chair. (Of course, this could be turned into an argument *against* Szabo’s account: if to make an object is to bring it into existence, then according to Szabo’s account the carpenter makes the chair as soon as she starts to make it, even if she never finishes making it – the wrong result.)

3. Overgeneration?

The concern that I addressed in the previous section is that the account of making in (2) *undergenerates* – that there are makings that (2) declares to be non-makings. There is also a concern that the account *overgenerates* – that there are non-makings that (2) declares to be makings.

Dick Boyd (in conversation) has suggested the following case. Suppose that John has a sheet of paper which he turns over. If (2) is correct, then John counts as having made the war in Iraq, because there is a kind *k* such that he changed the war in Iraq from not being a *k* into being a *k* – the kind *thing such that John’s sheet of paper is showing page 2 on top*. But John does not count as having made the war in Iraq, so (2) is not correct. This is perhaps not the best case with which to make the objection, because it relies on claiming that John changes the war in Iraq by turning over his sheet of paper. The problem with this is (a) it is not clear that such ‘Cambridge changes’ count as genuine changes, and (b) if they do, it is open to a defender of (2) to restrict the kind of changes that count as makings to non-Cambridge changes. Zoltan Szabo (in conversation) has suggested a better case.

⁷ Thanks to comments from an anonymous referee.

Suppose that John has a white house which he paints red. If (2) is correct, then John counts as having made his house, because there is a kind k such that he has changed his house from not being a k into being a k – the kind *red thing*. But John does not count as having made his house, so (2) is not correct. This is a better example, because it is clear that John has changed his house, and that the change is not a mere Cambridge change.

I agree with the intuition: it is *false* that John made his house. But this is not a counterexample to (2). (2) is formulated on the assumption that ‘make his house’ is read in a certain way – as meaning *make his house, simpliciter*. For John to make his house, simpliciter, is for there to be some kind k such that John changed his house from not being a k into being a k . This is something that John *did* do, so John made his house, simpliciter. There is also a reading of ‘make his house’ on which it means *make his house into a house* (I will justify this claim in the next section). For John to make his house into a house is for John to change his house from not being a house into being a house. This is something that John did *not* do, so John did *not* make his house into a house. For reasons that I shall consider in Section 7, it is the second reading that is most salient in the present context, and it is the second reading that we employ when we judge that John did not make his house. So I agree with the intuition, but I deny that this is a counterexample to (2).

But what about the true reading – can we make it more salient? I think that we can. Suppose that the home owners in John’s street have been asked to make their houses into more colorful ones by painting them. Did John make his house? I think that now the more natural response is ‘yes’. The fact that we need to consider a fairly unusual set of circumstances to raise the true reading to saliency is perhaps why in the original context it gets swamped by the far more commonly used false reading. Note that we find a similar thing happening with ‘be qualified’. There is a reading of ‘be qualified’ on which it means *be qualified to teach English*. So there is a reading of the following sentences on which they express a valid argument: the pilot of our plane is qualified to teach English, therefore the pilot of our plane is qualified. But we feel some reluctance to accept that a valid argument has been expressed. I suggest that the same thing is going on here: on the natural reading of the second sentence it means that the pilot of our plane is qualified *to fly a plane*, in which case an *invalid* argument is expressed. Although there is a reading of the second sentence on which a valid argument is expressed, it is a reading that is swamped by the natural reading, and because on the natural reading an invalid argument is expressed, we are reluctant to judge that a valid argument is expressed. These are issues to which I will return in Section 7.

I have just claimed that there are at least two readings of ‘John made his house’: that John made his house, simpliciter, and that John made his house into a house. I will consider in detail our use of ‘make x ’ in the next section, and argue that we use ‘make x ’ to mean a variety of different things. But at this point I should more carefully formulate the account of making that I am proposing, because what it is to make an object x depends on how we read ‘make x ’. Being more careful, then, the theory that I propose is this:

- (5) a. To make an object x (simpliciter) is to make x into a k , for some kind k .
- b. To make an object x into a kind k is to change x from not being a k into being a k .

I count as having this morning made the egg into a hard-boiled egg, because I changed it from not being a hard-boiled egg into being a hard-boiled egg. I do not count as having made the egg into an egg, because I did not change it from not being an egg into being an egg. I count as having made the egg, simpliciter, because there is a kind *k* such that I made the egg into a *k*. (5a) accounts for what it is to make *x* in terms of what it is to make *x* into a *k*. (5) is not thereby blatantly circular, because (5b) accounts for what it is to make *x* into a *k* in terms of *change*. (5) is no more blatantly circular than the following account of eating: to eat is to eat something; to eat something is to swallow it (this may not be a correct account of eating – the point is just that it is not blatantly circular).

5. Talking about making

In the previous section I accounted for an apparent counterexample to (2) by appealing to two readings of ‘make his house’. In this section I will support this appeal by considering in more detail the way that we talk about making.

Among the sentences that we use to talk about making there are two kinds that I want to consider: sentences such as (6a) below, in which we use the verb ‘make’ with a subject, a complement, and a modifier of the form ‘into a *k*’; and sentences such as (6b), in which we use the verb ‘make’ with just a subject and a complement:

- (6) a. Mary made a pile of timber into a chair
 b. John made an egg

Following a neo-Davidsonian approach to verbs and their modifiers, I propose that we use (6a) to talk about an event.⁸ We use the verb ‘make’ to specify that the event about which we are talking is a making event; we use the subject of ‘make’ (i.e. ‘Mary’) to specify that the agent of the making is Mary (the agent of a making is the person who does the making); we use the complement of ‘make’ (i.e. ‘a pile of timber’) to specify that the theme of the making is a pile of timber (the theme of a making is the thing that is made); we use the modifier ‘into a chair’ to specify that the kind of the making is the kind *chair* (the kind of a making is the kind *k* such that the theme of the making is changed from not being a *k* into being a *k*); and we use the past tense inflection on ‘make’ to specify that the making is in the past (of the utterance time). On this view, we can paraphrase (6a) as (7a) below, and (semi-) formalize it as in (7b).

- (7) a. There was a making by Mary of a pile of timber into a chair
 b. [Some *e*: *e* is an event][Some *x*: *x* is a pile of timber](Making(*e*) & Agent(*e*, Mary) & Theme(*e*, *x*) & Kind(*e*, chair))⁹

Much is the same of (6b): we use (6b) to talk about an event, we use the verb ‘make’ to specify that the event about which we are talking is a making event, and we use the subject of ‘make’ (i.e. ‘John’) to specify that the agent of the making is John. But in this case there

⁸ See Davidson (1980) for the origin of the idea that we use a sentence such as (6a) to talk about an event, and Parsons (1990) for an account of its neo-Davidsonian development.

⁹ I shall omit represent of tense from formalizations.

are two distinct ways in which we use the complement of ‘make’ (i.e. ‘an egg’). Either we use it specify that the *theme* of the making is an egg, in which case we leave the kind of the making unspecified, or we use it to specify that the *kind* of the making is the kind *egg*, in which case we leave the theme of the making unspecified. So there are two readings of (6b). The first can be paraphrased as in (8a.i) below, and formalized as in (8a.ii); the second can be paraphrased as in (8b.i), and formalized as in (8b.ii).

- (8) a. i. There was a making by John of an egg into something
 ii. [Some *e*: *e* is an event][Some *x*: *x* is an egg][Some *k*: *k* is a kind](Making(*e*) & Agent(*e*, John) & Theme(*e*, *x*) & Kind(*e*, *k*))
 b. i. There was a making by John of something into an egg
 ii. [Some *e*: *e* is an event][Some *x*: *x* is a thing](Making(*e*) & Agent(*e*, John) & Theme(*e*, *x*) & Kind(*e*, egg))

Why think that we have these two ways of using the complement of ‘make’ in (6b)? Here is one reason. Consider the chair case. While the carpenter is making the chair, and before she has finished, she might describe what she is doing as ‘making a chair’. This is a correct description of what she is doing, even if there are no chairs at the time. Thus, she is not using ‘a chair’ in her description to specify that the theme of her making is a chair. Perhaps she is using ‘a chair’ to specify that the theme of her making is a future chair. But what if she never actually makes a chair; then it is not a future chair. Also, this ought to be a general use that we have – to refer to an object as ‘a *k*’ when it is not at the time a *k* but will be a *k*. But it seems we have no such use: add to the story that the chair will later become broken; then there ought to be a reading on which she is making a broken chair, and there is no such reading. I propose instead that the carpenter is using ‘a chair’ to specify the kind of the making. By ‘I am making a chair’ she means that she is making something *into a chair*.

Szabo’s (2004, m.s.) account of the English progressive construction delivers a different account of how the carpenter uses ‘a chair’ in ‘I am making a chair’. We both agree that there are two ways that she might be using ‘a chair’, and that on the first way she uses it to specify that the theme of her making is a chair (in which case what she says is false, because the theme of her making is not yet a chair). But we disagree about the second use, on which she says something true. According to my proposal, she uses ‘a chair’ to specify that the *kind* of the making (a distinct thematic role) is the kind *chair*: the difference between the two readings is in which thematic role she uses ‘a chair’ to specify. According to Szabo’s proposal, she uses ‘a chair’ to specify that the *theme* of the making is a chair-in-progress: the difference between the two readings is in whether the theme is said to be a chair or a chair-in-progress.

Assessing the relative merits of these two accounts is not something that I can undertake in detail here, but here are two concerns for Szabo’s proposal that strike me as particularly pressing.

First concern. Suppose that Sue is making a chair. According to Szabo’s account, Sue’s making has a theme which is a chair-in-progress. Suppose that John is also working on this thing and making it into a table, so that it is also a table-in-progress. Since the theme of Sue’s making is a table-in-progress, on Szabo’s account it comes out true that Sue is

making a table. But that is intuitively the wrong result: Sue is not making a table – she is making a chair. There are at least two responses that Szabo might make. First, he might claim that it can't be true both that Sue is making a chair *and* that John is making a table unless the common theme of their makings can end up being both a chair and a table, and in fact does so if both Sue and John complete their makings; but then plausibly Sue *is* making a table, even if she doesn't realize it. Second, Szabo might claim that the theme of Sue's making and the theme of John's making are distinct but coincident objects, one of which is a chair-in-progress but not a table-in-progress, the other of which is a table-in-progress but not a chair-in-progress.

Second concern. Suppose that Sue is making a chair, so that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress. It seems informative to explain that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than, say, a table-in-progress) because it is a chair that Sue is making (rather than a table). But Szabo's account predicts that this is *uninformative*. According to his account, to say that it is a chair that Sue is making (rather than a table) is to say that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress). Thus, we ought to find it *uninformative* to be told that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress) because it is a chair that she is making (rather than a table), because that amounts to being told that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress) because the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress). The account that I have proposed, however, allows that this is informative. According to my account, to say that it is a chair that Sue is making (rather than a table) is to say that the kind of her making is the kind *chair* (rather than the kind *table*). Thus, it allows that we find it informative to be told that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress) because it is a chair that she is making (rather than a table), because that amounts to being told that the theme of her making is a chair-in-progress (rather than a table-in-progress) because the kind of her making is the kind *chair* (rather than the kind *table*).

I have proposed that a speaker might use (6b) in either of two ways – to mean either (8a) or (8b). There is more that I want to say about the first of these two uses, and this will be important for what I later do in this paper. I have proposed that by 'John made an egg' on the first use the speaker means (8a) above. But I think that the speaker might mean either of the following two things instead:

- (9) a. i. There was a making by John of an egg
 ii. [Some x : Event(x)] [Some y : Egg(y)] (Making(x) & Agent(x , John) & Theme(x , y))
- b. i. There was a making by John of an egg into a k
 ii. [Some x : Event(x)] [Some y : Egg(y)] (Making(x) & Agent(x , John) & Theme(x , y) & Kind(x , k))

The difference between (8a) and (9a) is this: if the speaker means (8a) then she has a general thought about the kind that the egg was made into, to the effect that it is some kind or other; whereas if the speaker means (9a) then she has no thought at all about the kind that the egg is being made into. If the metaphysical proposal that I have made about making is correct, then there is no truth conditional difference between what the speaker means in

these two cases – there is a making by John of an egg just in case there is a making by John of an egg into some kind *k*. That there is a distinction between these two readings is not something that I want to defend here, and it is not significant for what I shall do in the rest of the paper – I mention it just for completeness.

It is the use in (9b) in which I am most interested. What I am proposing that there is a use of ‘John made an egg’ on which the speaker means, for some kind *k* that the speaker has in mind, that John made an egg into a *k*. In general, I am proposing that sometimes (perhaps often) by ‘make *x*’ we do not mean *make x* (simpliciter), or *make x into something*, but the more specific *make x into a k*, for some particular kind *k* that we have in mind. Why think this? Having just enjoyed some scrambled eggs at a café you ask, ‘Who made these eggs?’ If the waiter were to reply that some hens made them you would naturally explain that this not what you meant – you meant who made the eggs *into scrambled eggs* (and this is a distinct question from the question of who made the eggs, simpliciter – it is true that some hens made the eggs, simpliciter, but false that they made them into scrambled eggs, so some true answers to the second question are not true answers to the first).

These are cases in which there is a constituent of what the speaker means by ‘make *x*’ that does not correspond to any overt expression in ‘make *x*’ itself – what we might call an *unarticulated constituent*. I like to describe them as cases in which we are not fully explicit about what we mean: we utter ‘make *x*’ and mean *make x into a k* – we could have been more explicit about what we mean by uttering ‘make *x* into a *k*’ instead. There are many examples of this phenomenon involving our use of other expressions: by ‘ready’ we often mean *ready to a*, for some particular action *a* that we have in mind; by ‘qualified’ we often mean *qualified for p*, for some particular position *p* that we have in mind; by ‘tall’ we often mean *tall for a k*, for some particular kind *k* that we have in mind; by ‘raining’ we often mean *raining at l*, for some particular location *l* that we have in mind; and so on. These are all cases in which that which a speaker means by an expression contains an unarticulated constituent – cases of inexplicit speech. I am not assuming any particular view about the syntax of the verb phrase ‘make *x*’. What I am claiming is that sometimes there is a constituent of that which a speaker means by ‘make *x*’ that does not correspond to any *overt* constituent of ‘make *x*’ itself. In such cases, there may or may not be a *covert* constituent of ‘make *x*’ to which this unarticulated constituent corresponds – perhaps a hidden indexical whose value is set by the context (and presumably whose value is set explicitly when we utter ‘make *x* into a *k*’, and which gets bound by an existential quantifier when we utter ‘make *x*, simpliciter’). Either way, in such utterances of ‘make *x*’ there is an unarticulated constituent in that which the speaker means, whose value an audience must work out in order to fully understand the speaker.¹⁰

Why are we sometimes not fully explicit? At least one reason is that we do not need to be – the interpretive abilities of those to whom we speak are so good that we can rely on them to understand what we mean, even when we do not make it fully explicit (at least in general). Sometimes we rely on the context to give interpretive clues. If we are in a context in which

¹⁰ I am thus using the expression ‘unarticulated constituent’ differently from how John Perry (1986, 1998) uses it. He reserves the term for constituents for which there is nothing in the sentence to which it corresponds, overt or covert. I prefer to call these *unrepresented constituents*.

it is known that Mary is a carpenter and we are discussing her recent work, then I can assertively utter ‘Mary made the chair’ and expect to be understood as meaning that Mary made the chair *into a chair*. If what I meant were that Mary made the chair *into a piece of art* then I could not as well expect to be understood. If we are in the context of an art class in which I have given each of my students an old piece of furniture to decorate into works of art – a chair, a table, a stool, and so on – then at the end of the class I can assertively utter ‘Mary made the chair’ and expect to be understood as meaning that Mary made the chair *into a piece of art*. If what I meant were that Mary made the chair *into a chair* then I could not as well expect to be understood. Sometimes we give interpretive clues by referring to the made object in a certain way. Suppose that *x* is an old chair which has been converted into a piece of art. If I want to communicate that Mary made *x* into a chair, then it is most helpful to my audience to refer to it as ‘this chair’ or ‘the chair’: ‘Mary made this chair’. Referring to *x* in one these ways makes the kind *chair* salient. But if I want to communicate that Mary made *x* into a piece of art then it is most helpful to my audience to refer to it as ‘this piece of art’ or ‘the piece of art’: ‘Mary made this piece of art’. Referring to *x* in one these ways makes the kind *piece of art* salient. To see how helpful the manner of reference can be, suppose that I say instead, ‘Mary made this’. Then my audience will need to take more cues from the extra-linguistic context in order to correctly interpret whether I mean that she made it into a chair or that she made it into a piece of art (or some other kind of thing).

The importance of these remarks will become clear in the next two sections.

6. An application: the statue and the alloy

I now want to take the account of making that I developed Sections 2-4, together with the account of how we talk about making that I developed in Section 5, and apply them to the problem of the statue and the piece of alloy: when a statue is coincident with a piece of alloy, is the statue identical to the piece of alloy (the *monist* position) or distinct from it (the *pluralist* position)?¹¹ (This amounts to questioning one of the premises of the first argument in Section 2: when a carpenter makes a chair from some thing, is the chair that she makes identical to or distinct from that thing?)

There are well-known arguments for the pluralist position that appeal to Leibniz’s Law (the indiscernibility of identicals). Here is one: the statue can survive the replacement of parts; the piece of alloy cannot survive the replacement of parts; so, by Leibniz’s Law, the statue is not identical to the piece of alloy. Here is another: the statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque; so, by Leibniz’s Law, the statue is not identical to the piece of alloy. In general, arguments of this kind go as follows: the statue has (or does not have) property *p*; the piece of alloy does not have (or has) property *p*; so, by Leibniz’s Law, the statue is not identical to the piece of alloy.¹²

¹¹ For a classic discussion of this problem see Thomson (1998).

¹² Thomson (1998, p. 150) is persuaded by arguments of the first kind. Fine (2003, pp. 205-8) prefers arguments of the second kind.

I find many of these arguments unconvincing, because I find it implausible that the premises are both true. It seems to me that if the statue can survive the replacement of parts then so too can the piece of alloy (perhaps the alloy which composes the piece of alloy cannot survive the replacement of parts, but the *piece* of alloy can – it can have some of its alloy replaced and still be the same piece of alloy, even if composed of different alloy). And it seems to me that if the statue is Romanesque then so too is the piece of alloy (we might say: that’s a very Romanesque piece of alloy!). I find this a plausible response for many properties p .¹³ But there is one property for which I find this response initially less plausible – the property of being made by the artist. It strikes me as true that the statue was made by the artist (that the artist made the statue), but false that the piece of alloy was made by the artist (that the artist made the piece of alloy). So I find the argument in (10) below a more convincing way to argue that the statue is not the piece of alloy.¹⁴

- (10) The artist made the statue
The artist did not make the piece of alloy
Therefore, the statue is not the piece of alloy

Although initially more convincing, I believe that the present account of making and of how we talk about making shows that this argument is unsound.

Suppose that we take the premises of the argument at face value, so that what is meant by the first is that the artist made the statue, simpliciter, and what is meant by the second is that the artist did not make the piece of alloy, simpliciter. Then according to (5) we can make the two premises more explicit as follows:

- (11) The artist made the statue into a k , for some kind k
The artist did not make the piece of alloy into a k , for any kind k ¹⁵

So understood, it is plausible that the first premise is true – there is a kind k such that the artist made the statue into a k (the kind *statue* for one). But it is plausible that the second premise is false – there is a kind k such that the artist made the piece of alloy into a k (again, the kind *statue* for one). So if this is how we are to understand the premises then the argument has a false premise and is therefore unsound.

Maybe this is not how we should understand the premises. Maybe there is a particular kind k such that what is meant by the first is that the artist made the statue into a k , and there is a particular kind k' such that what is meant by the second is that the artist did not make the piece of alloy into a k' . I can see four relevant ways of thus understanding the two premises:

¹³ See Frances (2006) for a detailed defence of this kind of response.

¹⁴ Fine (2003) considers the properties *being well made* and *being badly made* – he defends the claim that the statue is well made but the piece of alloy is not, so that the statue is not identical to the piece of alloy. I consider what Fine has to say in Section 7.

¹⁵ This is a more idiomatic version of the negation of ‘the artist made the piece of alloy into a k , for some kind k .’ Note that the view is *not* committed to claiming that this is the only way of understanding ‘the artist did not make the piece of alloy’ – it could also be understood to mean, for some particular kind k , that the artist did not make the piece of alloy into a k . More on this below.

- (12) a. The artist made the statue into a statue
 The artist did not make the piece of alloy into a piece of alloy
- b. The artist made the statue into a statue
 The artist did not make the piece of alloy into a statue
- c. The artist made the statue into a piece of alloy
 The artist did not make the piece of alloy into a piece of alloy
- d. The artist made the statue into a concrete thing
 The artist did not make the piece of alloy into a concrete thing

(12a) is perhaps the most natural way of understanding the premises: when it is said that the artist made the statue, it is most natural to understand this as ‘the artist made the statue *into a statue*’ – referring to an object as ‘the statue’ makes salient the kind *statue*; when it is said that the artist did not make the piece of alloy, it is most natural to understand this as ‘the artist did not make the piece of alloy *into a piece of alloy*’ – referring to an object as ‘the piece of alloy’ makes salient the kind *piece of alloy*. So understood, it is plausible that both premises are true – the artist did make the statue into a statue (she changed it from not being a statue into being a statue), and the artist did not make the piece of alloy into a piece of alloy (she did not change it from not being a piece of alloy into being a piece of alloy). But, so understood, Leibniz’s Law does not validly apply – the statue is said to have the property of being made by the artist *into a statue*; the piece of alloy is said not to have the property of being made by the artist *into a piece of alloy*, and these are distinct properties: it is possible to change something from not being a statue into being a statue, without changing it from not being a piece of alloy into being a piece of alloy. So if this is how we are to understand the premises of (10) then the argument is invalid and therefore unsound.

The other three ways of understanding the premises are perhaps not the most natural in the present context: referring to the statue as ‘the statue’ makes salient the kind *statue*, and referring to it as ‘the piece of alloy’ makes salient the kind *piece of alloy*. But they are, nevertheless, ways that the premises can be understood. We are not compelled to understand ‘make the *k*’ as ‘make the *k* into a *k*’, and in some contexts it is more natural to understand it as ‘make the *k* into a *k*’, for some kind *k*’ distinct from *k*. Suppose that a teacher gives her first student a piece of alloy, her second student a lump of dough, her third student a lump of putty, and asks the three of them to shape them into a dinosaur. Later, with the finished items on her desk, she points to one and asks, ‘Who made the piece of alloy?’ In this context, it is natural to understand her as asking, ‘Who made the piece of alloy into a dinosaur?’ (rather than ‘into a piece of alloy’).

When the premises are understood as in (12b), (12c) or (12d) Leibniz’s Law does indeed apply – in each case it is a single property that the statue is said to have but the piece of alloy is said not to have – and it can be validly concluded that the statue is not the piece of alloy. But in each case it is not so plausible that both premises are true. On the reading in (12b), it is not so plausible that the second premise is true – the claim is that the artist did not make the piece of alloy into a statue, and that seems implausible (in fact, that is how the situation is typically described when setting up the problem). On the reading in (12c), it is not so plausible that the first premise is true – the claim is that the artist made the statue into a piece of alloy, and that seems implausible. On the reading in (12d), it is not so plausible that the first premise is true – the claim is that the artist made the statue into a

concrete thing, and that seems implausible. So if any of these is how we are to understand the premises of (10) then plausibly the argument has a false premise and is therefore unsound.

Once we make more explicit the possible ways of interpreting the premises in (10), we can see why the argument is initially persuasive (because on their natural interpretations the premises are both plausibly true), but also we can see that either the argument is invalid or the premises are not both true. Either way the argument is unsound, and, like the arguments that appeal to surviving the loss of parts or to being Romanesque, it is not a convincing way to argue that the statue is distinct from the piece of alloy.¹⁶

7. Fine

The argument against the monist position that I have been considering, the argument in (10), is very similar to an argument against the monist position that Kit Fine (2003) considers, the argument in (13) below:

- (13) The statue is well made
The piece of alloy is not well made
Therefore, the statue is not the piece of alloy

Fine considers various ways that a monist might respond to this argument, including one that he calls a ‘predicational shift’ response: the argument is invalid, because ‘well made’ expresses different properties in the two premises; in the first premise it expresses the property of being well made *as a statue*, in the second premise it expresses the property of being well made *as a piece of alloy*, the difference in property being induced by the difference in the subject terms of the sentences used to express the premises. Fine argues that this response cannot be maintained because it must rely on implausible linguistic claims.

This predicational shift response to (13) that Fine considers and rejects is very similar to part of the response that I have given to (10). I have proposed that on the natural reading of (10) it expresses an invalid argument, because what is meant by ‘make’ in the first premise is ‘make *into a statue*’, whereas what is meant by ‘make’ in the second premise is ‘make *into a piece of alloy*’, the difference being induced by the manner in which the theme of the making is referred to in each case. It is thus worth seeing whether Fine’s argument against the predicational shift response to (13) can be made to work as an argument against my ‘predicational shift’ response to (10). I shall argue that it cannot. I will imagine a counterpart to Fine, call him Fine’, running a version of Fine’s argument against my predicational shift response, and I will argue that Fine’ fails. I suspect that the things that

¹⁶ Here is a possible concern: I have appealed to a certain account of making in order to defend the claim that the statue is identical to the piece of alloy from which it is made, but in order to defend the account of making to which I have appealed I have assumed that when something is made it is identical to that from which it is made. But I haven’t assumed this – the second argument in Section 2 shows that the account of making can be defended without making this assumption.

are wrong with Fine's argument are also wrong with Fine's original argument, but I will not argue that here.

Fine' says that according to my predicational shift response to (10) 'make' is a sort-relative predicate, like the predicate 'be qualified' (which he takes to be sort-relative). The first step in his argument is to establish that 'make' does not behave like 'be qualified' and other sort-relative predicates, and that the monist has no good explanation of this. I shall argue that this first step fails, and along with it the rest of the argument.

There are three phenomena that Fine' argues are problematic for the idea that 'make' is sort-relative. The first is the following. In each of the cases in (14a) below, 'make' is naturally understood as 'make into a statue' rather than 'make into a piece of alloy', even when 'piece of alloy' is used in the additional qualification. Similarly, in each of the cases in (14b), 'make' is naturally understood as 'make into a piece of alloy' rather than 'make into a statue', even when 'statue' is used in the additional qualification. The governing sortal term is what determines the natural reading of 'make' in each case, and the ensuing qualification makes no difference.

- (14) a. i. The artist made the statue
ii. The artist made the statue that is coincident with a piece of alloy
iii. The artist made the statue that was made from a piece of alloy
b. i. The artist made the piece of alloy
ii. The artist made the piece of alloy that is coincident with a statue
iii. The artist made the piece of alloy that was made into a statue

Fine' argues that this can be explained by the pluralist but not by the monist. The pluralist explanation goes as follows: the governing sortal term determines which of the two things is being referred to, the statue or the piece of alloy, which in turn determines the natural reading of 'make'; the ensuing qualifications make no difference to which thing is being referred to, and hence no difference to the natural reading of 'make'. But, Fine' asks, if 'make' is sort-relative, "why should it matter how the information that might serve to invoke a relevant respect is presented?" (Fine asks this question on p. 213).

Well, why shouldn't it? Here is a monist account on which it should. According to the sort-relative view that I have proposed, by 'make' a speaker means *make into a k*, for some kind *k* that she has in mind. To properly understand the speaker, her audience has to figure out which kind it is that she has in mind, and the most natural choice is the kind that she uses to refer to the theme of the making. In each case in (14a) above, the theme is referred to *as a statue*; it is not referred to as a piece of alloy, even if mention is also made of a piece of alloy. Thus, it is natural to interpret the speaker as having in mind the kind *statue*. In each case in (14b), the theme is referred to *as a piece of alloy*; it is not referred to as a statue, even if mention is also made of a statue. Thus, it is natural to interpret the speaker as having in mind the kind *piece of alloy*. The pluralist claims that the governing sortal term determines which of two things is referred to, which in turn determines the natural reading of 'make'; the monist can equally well claim that the governing sortal term determines which of two ways that thing is thought about, which in turn determines the natural reading of 'make'.

Problems arise for the pluralist explanation when we consider similar examples involving ‘be qualified’, where we find exactly the same phenomenon. In each of the cases in (15a) below, ‘be qualified’ is naturally understood as ‘be qualified to drive a bus’ rather than ‘be qualified to fly a plane’, even when ‘pilot’ is used in the additional qualification. Similarly, in each of the cases in (15b), ‘be qualified’ is naturally understood as ‘be qualified to fly a plane’ rather than ‘be qualified to drive a bus’, even when ‘bus driver’ is used in the additional qualification. The governing sortal term is what determines the natural reading of ‘be qualified’ in each case, and the ensuing qualification makes no difference. So the fact that ‘make’ behaves as in (14) above gives us no reason to think that it is not sort-relative, because ‘be qualified’ behaves in the same way.

- (15) a. i. The bus driver is qualified
 ii. The bus driver who knows a pilot is qualified
 iii. The bus driver who wants to be a pilot is qualified
 b. i. The pilot is qualified
 ii. The pilot who knows a bus driver is qualified
 iii. The pilot who wants to be a bus driver is qualified

The problems get worse for the pluralist when we she tries to explain the behaviour of ‘be qualified’ exhibited in (15). If she uses the same explanation that she uses in the case of ‘make’ then she has to say that there are two distinct things under discussion in (15) – one a bus driver, one a pilot. If she wants to avoid this conclusion, then she must provide a different explanation of the behaviour of ‘be qualified’. The monist explanation of the behaviour of ‘make’, on the other hand, carries over straightforwardly to the behaviour of ‘be qualified’.

The second phenomenon that Fine' argues is problematic for the idea that ‘make’ is sort-relative is the following. If ‘make’ is a sort-relative predicate then we would expect to have ways of making the relevant sort explicit in the predicate itself, just as we do in the case of ‘be qualified’: the driver of our bus is qualified *to drive a bus*. Fine' claims that in the case of ‘make’ we have no such way. We can make some sense of things like ‘make as a statue’, but these are philosophical inventions and have no basis in ordinary usage.

Whether or not this part of the original Fine argument with ‘well made’ is a good one, this part of the Fine' argument with ‘make’ is clearly not. We naturally make the relevant sort explicit using modifiers of the form ‘into a ...’. If what is meant by ‘The artist made the statue’ is that the artist made the statue into a statue, then we have a very natural way of making that explicit – the way that I just did: ‘The artist made the statue *into a statue*.’

The third phenomenon that Fine' argues is problematic for the idea that ‘make’ is sort-relative is the following. In the case of ‘be qualified’, it may be that a sort provided by the nonlinguistic context trumps the sort provided by the subject term. In an appropriate context ‘The driver of our bus is qualified’ is naturally understood as ‘The driver of our bus is qualified to fly a plane’: “Is anyone here qualified to fly a plane? Yes, the driver of our bus is qualified.” Fine' argues that the same kind of thing is not possible with ‘make’, which is surprising if ‘make’ is a sort-relative predicate like ‘be qualified’.

But the same kind of thing *is* possible with ‘make’. I have already given examples to show this. Suppose the children in a class are making statues from various materials; then the natural reading of the question, ‘Who made the piece of alloy’, is the question, ‘Who made the piece of alloy *into a statue?*’ (rather than *into a piece of alloy*). Fine’ raises the possibility that we are understanding ‘the piece of alloy’ as referring to the statue, either because it is elliptical for ‘the piece of alloy statue’, or because we use ‘the piece of alloy’ to refer to the piece of alloy and thereby (metonymically) to the statue (the piece of alloy goes proxy for the statue), or because we are using ‘piece’ to mean ‘piece of art’. To avoid these possibilities, he asks us to consider the question, ‘Who made the piece of alloy from which this statue was made?’, the idea being that this sentence precludes understanding ‘the piece of alloy’ as referring to the statue. He claims that there is no context in which this can be understood as, ‘Who made into a statue the piece of alloy from which this statue was made?’ But it seems to me that there is. If the one above is not already one, we can modify it into one. Suppose that rather than all making statues the children in the class are making various things – statues, paper weights, and so on; then the natural reading of the question, ‘Who made the piece of alloy from which the statue was made’, is the question, ‘Who made *into a statue* the piece of alloy from which the statue was made?’. Finally, Fine’ argues that the predicational shift response also has a problem explaining the following phenomenon. Suppose that there are two statues, each coincident with a piece of alloy. Suppose that John made the first statue into a statue but did not make its piece of alloy into a piece of alloy, and that he did not make the second statue into a statue but he did make its piece of alloy into a piece of alloy. If the predicational shift story is right, then there should be a false reading of the sentence ‘John made the first piece of alloy, and the second piece of alloy too’, because there should be a reading on which it means, ‘John made the first piece of alloy into a statue, and the second piece of alloy into a statue’ (which is false, because the second conjunct is false). Fine’ claims that there is no such reading, asking, ‘how could we understand it in that way?’ Well, it seems to me that we perfectly well can, and I don’t see any reason to favor his intuition that we cannot over my intuition that we can.

I hope to have shown, then, that Fine’ fails to establish that ‘make’ does not behave as we would expect it to if it is a sort-relative predicate like ‘be qualified’, and thus fails to undermine my response to (10).

This concludes my defence of the monist position against the argument in (10). I have by no means offered a thorough defence of the monist position – just a defence of it against one apparent problem. But I do hope to have shown the importance of getting clear about the nature of making and the way that we talk about it.¹⁷

References

Davidson, D. (1980), ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, in his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 105-48.

¹⁷ Thanks to Stephen Kearns, Ofra Magidor, David Liebesman, Zoltan Szabo, an anonymous referee, and an audience at Cornell.

- Fine, K. (2003), 'The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter', *Mind* **112**, pp. 195-234.
- Fine, K. (2006), 'Arguing for Non-identity: A Response to King and Frances', *Mind* **115**, pp. 1059-82.
- Frances, B. (2006), 'The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism', *Mind* **115**, pp. 1007-21.
- King, J. (2006), 'Semantics for Monists', *Mind* **115**, pp. 1023-58.
- Parsons, T. (1990), *Events in the Semantics of English* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Perry, J. (1986), 'Thought without Representation I', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* **60**, pp. 137-51.
- Perry, J. (1998), 'Indexicals, Contexts and Unarticulated Constituents', in *Proceedings of the 1995 CSLI-Amsterdam Logic, Language and Computation Conference* (Stanford: CSLI Publications).
- Szabo, Z. G. (2004), 'On the Progressive and the Perfective', *Noûs* **38**, pp. 29-59.
- Szabo, Z. G. (m.s.), 'Things in Progress'.
- Thomson, J. J. (1998), 'The Statue and the Clay', *Noûs* **32**, pp. 149-73.
- Williamson, T. (1998), 'Bare Possibilia', *Erkenntnis* **48**, pp. 257-73.
- Williamson, T. (2000), 'The Necessary Framework of Objects', *Topoi* **19**, pp. 201-8.
- Williamson, T. (2002), 'Necessary Existents', in A. O'Hear (ed.) (2002), *Logic, Thought and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 233-51.