

Jackson on the Adverbial Theory

1. The question: What is it for John to experience a red, round after image and a green, square after image?
2. The answer that I give: It is for John to sense in the manner in which one senses when sensing a red, round thing and a green, square thing – the *m* such when one senses a red, round thing and a green, square thing one senses in manner *m*.
3. I actually don't like this way of talking, and would prefer to talk as follows:

Q: What is it for it to look to John as if he is seeing a red, round object and a green, square object?

A: It is for it to look to John the way it looks if he is seeing a red, round object and a green, square object.

4. This account does not suffer from Jackson's many properties problem:

For John to experience a red, square after image and a green, round after image is for John to sense in the manner in which one senses when sensing a red, square thing and a green, round thing – the *m* such when one senses a red, square thing and a green, round thing one senses in manner *m*.

There is nothing in the theory that commits it to the two manners being identical (and plausibly they are in fact distinct).

5. Jackson considers and rejects some accounts that are similar to mine:
 - a. It is for John to sense in the manner in which John normally senses when sensing a red, round thing and a green, square thing.

(problem: what if John never senses such things?)
 - b. It is for John to sense in the manner in which people in general normally sense when sensing a red, round thing and a green, square thing.

(problem: what if no one ever senses such things?)
 - c. It is for John to sense in the manner in which he would sense were he sensing a red, round thing and a green, square thing.

(problem: what if John is colour blind?)

6. My account does not suffer these problems. To see why, I should say more about what I mean by ‘the manner m such that one senses in manner m when sensing a red, round thing and a green, square thing’.
 - a. I intend ‘one senses in manner m when sensing a red, round thing and green, square thing’ to be read *generically*.
 - b. On this reading, it expresses a non-extensional relation between two properties: being an event in which one senses a red, round thing and a green, square thing, and being an event in which one senses in manner m .
 - c. This relation can obtain between these two properties, even if they have no actual instances, and even if they have no possible instances. All it requires is that there be such properties.
 - d. What is this relation like? I’m not sure, but it helps to think of it this way: for it to obtain between two properties is for there to be some kind of law-like connection between the two properties.
 - e. There is a reading of ‘Turtles are long-lived’ on which it expresses a non-extensional relation between the properties of being a turtle and of being long-lived. Perhaps this is the same relation.
 - f. Perhaps laws of nature such as ‘Heavy objects sink in water’ are expressions of this very same relation – a non-extensional relation between two properties.
 - g. Is it plausible that there is such a manner? Yes, as long as we recognize that manners vary in their degree of generality, and that it will need to be a fairly general manner.
 - h. But because manners can be very general, I have to make a slight modification: it is for John to sense in the *maximally specific* manner in which one senses when sensing a red, square thing and a green, round thing.
 - i. What are manners? Nothing too spooky – I take them to be properties of events, and there is some precedence for doing so. Manners of sensing are properties of sensing events.

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