

Making

1. Question: what is it to make an object x ?
2. My negative answer: it is not to bring x into existence. Why not? Because existence is eternal: Always: everything that exists always exists.
3. Ok, so it is to bring x into concreteness? Sometimes, but not always.
4. My semantic proposal: By 'make x ' we mean 'make x into a k ', for some kind k . My metaphysical proposal: To make x into a k is to change x from not being a k into being a k .
5. k might be the kind *concrete object*, but it need not be:
 - a. Stephen made the cake.
 - b. Stephen made the egg.
 - c. Stephen made the bed.

6. An application: the statue and the lump of clay.

- a. An argument for why they are not identical: the artist made the statue; the artist did not make the lump of clay; so the statue is not the lump of clay.
- b. My response: The argument is not sound – if the premises are both true then the argument is not valid; if the argument is valid then the premises are not both true.
- c. We can see this by making the two premises more explicit:

The artist made the statue into a statue. (T)

The artist did not make the lump of clay into a lump of clay. (T)

The artist made the statue into a statue. (T)

The artist did not make the lump of clay into a statue. (F)

The artist made the statue into a lump of clay. (F)

The artist did not make the lump of clay into a lump of clay. (T)

The artist made the statue into a concrete object. (F)

The artist did not make the lump of clay into a concrete object. (T)

- d. Analogy:

The person who applied for the position of professor is not qualified; the person who applied for the position of janitor is qualified; so the person who applied for the position of professor is not the person who applied for the position of janitor.

Appendix: Some of Williamson's arguments for necessary existence

1. It follows from the simplest semantic account of quantified modal logic, according to which the quantifiers in every world range over the same domain. The complications involved in the alternative semantic accounts "are a warning sign of philosophical error."
2. Those who complicate the semantics by restricting quantification in a world to its own unique domain presuppose, when giving their semantic account, that their quantifiers (i.e. in the meta-language) are under no such restriction. Why impose that restriction on the object language, particularly when the object language just is the metalanguage (English)?
3. Suppose that something, call it *d*, does not necessarily exist. So *d* might not have existed. If *d* had not existed, it still would have been that everything exists. So we would have: everything exists, but *d* does not exist. But that is not possible.
4. We sometimes count possibilia across worlds. Suppose there are two jackets, J1 and J2, and two trousers, T1 and T2, and that a suit is made by hanging a jacket with a pair of trousers. It is not possible to make more than two suits, but there are four possible suits that could be made.
5. A direct argument:
 - a. Necessarily: if *a* does not exist then the proposition that *a* does not exist is true.
 - b. Necessarily: if the proposition that *a* does not exist is true then the proposition that *a* does not exist exists.
 - c. Necessarily: if the proposition that *a* does not exist exists then *a* exists.

 - d. Necessarily: if *a* does not exist then *a* exists.
 - e. Necessarily: *a* exists.