

'red'

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1. **The question:** What does 'red' contribute to the truth conditions of sentences of which it is a constituent?
2. **One answer** (very common): $\{x: x \text{ is red}\}$.
3. **Problem:** 'Patch looks red'. If the red things happen to be the round things then we get the wrong truth conditions.
4. **Three reactions** (each no good):
 - 4.1. 'red' is used with a different sense in 'Patch looks red': perhaps $\{x: x \text{ looks red}\}$.
But: 'Patch looks red, but I'm not sure that it is.'
 - 4.2. Go intensional with 'looks'.
But: wrong explanation.
 - 4.3. Modes of presentation.
But: 'Patch looks round', 'Patch looks circular'.
5. **My suggestion:** 'red' denotes a set of colours. Above problem avoided, and more intuitive. Committed to the existence of colours.
6. **Problem:** 'Patch looks red and round'. 'red and round' denotes the empty set, and we get the wrong truth conditions.
7. **Two reactions** (each no good):
 - 7.1. [[Patch looks red] and [Patch looks round]]
 - 7.2. Patch [[looks red] and [looks round]]
But: suppose that Patch looks red and square to me, but green and round to you.
8. **My suggestion:** In 'Patch looks red' and 'Patch looks round', 'red' and 'round' are each used to contribute a set of *ways* to the truth conditions. This despite the denotation of 'red' being a set of colours, the denotation of 'round' being a set of shapes, and there being no ambiguity in either 'red' or 'round'. Committed to the existence of ways.