

PHIL 332: Philosophy of Language  
Class 29: 'Dthis', 'Dthat', and the 'Dother'

1. To know that by 'yes' I have said yes you must know that I am speaking English, but I have not said that I am speaking English. (If you think I am speaking Knoh then you will incorrectly think that I have said no.)

You must work out that I am speaking English – I haven't said so.

But even if I say so, by adding 'I am speaking English', you still must work out that I am speaking English.

Linguistic competence is not enough to determine what has been said.

2. Other examples: a haberdasher says, 'I am out of checks'; a wife says, 'You must punish Jordan.'
3. Kaplan is especially interested in demonstratives on this paper: 'This', 'that', 'thus' (?). And also so-called *complex demonstratives*: 'this bottle', 'that chair', 'thus way' (?).

The use of a demonstrative is typically accompanied by a demonstration (e.g. a pointing). But it need not be.

Another illustration that linguistic competence is not enough to determine what has been said.

4. The question: when I refer to an object using a demonstrative, is the way in which I demonstrate the object part of what I have said, or is it the object itself?

Consider: 'He is lazy'.

Here is a reason to think that there is an ambiguity in this sentence. There is an ambiguity in the following sentence:

'He might not have been lazy.'

5. There is a difference in how we evaluate what is meant by 'he' in each case in other worlds. Do we march around a guy, or a way of picking out a guy?
6. It is like the ambiguity we saw earlier with definite descriptions. There is an ambiguity in:

'The hottest guy in Hollywood is Guy Pierce.'

This can be shown by the ambiguity in:

'The hottest guy in Hollywood might not have been Guy Pierce.'

7. It is also like the ambiguity associated with proper names. There is an ambiguity in:

'Clark Kent is strong.'

This can be shown by the ambiguity in:

'Lois believes that Clark Kent is strong.'

8. Perhaps there is a unified phenomenon here. Kaplan suggests that there is. In general, we have the object referred to, and the manner of referring. The ambiguity is in which goes into what is said. Call this a demonstrative vs. non-demonstrative ambiguity.

Note that often it makes no truth-conditional difference.

Kaplan suggests thinking of this as a *de dicto* – *de re* ambiguity. It is not a scope ambiguity.

9. Kaplan: "At a minimum I could introduce the new word 'dthat' for the demonstrative use of 'that'. Couldn't I? I can, and I will. In fact, I do." This is a device of disambiguation.

10. We can also stipulate: 'dthis', 'dhe', 'dNoam', etc.

Whether or not 'Hesperus rises in the morning' and 'Phosphorus rises in the morning' say the same thing, by stipulation 'dHesperus rises in the morning' and 'dPhosphorus rises in the morning' do.

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