

PHIL 6710: Epistemic Modality  
Possible paper topics

1. **Necessary falsehoods.** Are these a problem for the standard account? Does the standard account need to be reformulated to handle them? How does relativism fare with them?
2. **'For all we know', 'given what we know'.** What do we mean by these expressions? How are they connected with epistemic modality?
3. **Degrees of possibility.** Does epistemic possibility come in degrees? How does this effect accounts of epistemic possibility?
4. **Retractions and eavesdroppers.** Can the standard account handle these?
5. **Epistemic modals and barn cases.** Is there an interesting connection between the two?
6. **Danger.** What should we make of Hawthorne's danger-theoretic account?
7. **Ambiguity by design.** What should we make of van Fintel and Gillies' account in terms of ambiguity by design?
8. **Disjunctivism.** What the heck?
9. **Epistemic?** Are epistemic uses of 'possibly' and 'necessarily' really epistemic?
10. **Evidential aspects.** Do the meanings of 'possibly' and 'necessarily' have an evidential component? If so, is it only when they are used epistemically? If so, why is it not there when they are used non-epistemically?
11. **And/or.** Does it make no difference? If not, why not?